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REMEDIES, NEUTRAL RULES AND FREE SPEECH 
David F. Partlett* and Russell L. Weaver** 
  I.  INTRODUCTION  
New York Times v. Sullivan1 has avid fans, passionate supporters, 
and a few critics.2  No matter the passion or the criticism, Sullivan has 
endured and has assumed global significance by encouraging foreign 
courts to re-examine their defamation jurisprudence.3  But Sullivan has 
tended to cause us to look at the First Amendment through a narrow 
lens.  We have cheered the idea of robust speech and the shedding of the 
shackles of defamation law, and embraced the Court’s decisions 
restricting press licensing provisions4 and prior restraints.5  But, in the 
process, we have allowed courts and legislatures to hollow or emasculate 
the press through other doctrines. 
II.  EXAMINING THE PRESS’ SPECIAL LEGAL PROTECTIONS 
For decades, courts and commentators have debated whether the 
First Amendment provides the press with special protections.6  In 
 
* Dean and Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. 
** Professor of Law and Distinguished University Scholar, University of Louisville, Louis D. 
Brandeis School of Law. 
 1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 2. See Russell L. Weaver & Geoffrey J.G. Bennett, Is the New York Times Actual Malice 
Standard Really Necessary: A Comparative Perspective, 53 LA. L. REV. 1153 (1993). 
 3. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ANDREW T. KENYON, DAVID F. PARTLETT & CLIVE P. 
WALKER, THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ILL: DEFAMATION, REPUTATION & FREE SPEECH (Carolina Press 
2006). 
 4. See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
 5. See, e.g., Near v. State of Minn., 283 U.S. 697 (1931); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 6. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The 
press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to 
set newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the public’s right to know.  The 
right to know is crucial to the governing powers of the people.”); Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 
HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (“[T]he Free Press Clause extends protection to an institution.  The 
1
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general, the Court has provided little protection for the newsgathering 
process.  In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,7 the United States Supreme Court 
refused to protect the press against police searches of their newsroom.  
In that case, four police officers searched a paper’s file cabinets, 
wastepaper baskets, desks and photographic laboratories for evidence 
related to a crime.  Likewise, in Branzburg v. Hayes,8 the Court held that 
the press did not have the right to preserve the confidentiality of its 
sources against governmental inquiry.  Although the Branzburg decision 
was a narrow one,9 the issues presented by that case have not 
disappeared.  In recent months, New York Times reporter Judith Miller 
spent weeks in jail for refusal to reveal a source, and Matthew Cooper 
was threatened with jail time prior to Miller’s incarceration.10  In the 
Miller/Cooper cases, the courts again rejected recognizing any special 
privilege resting in the press. 
Other cases revolve around the question of whether the press has an 
elevated status in gathering news.  These cases involve the well-known 
principle invoked by Branzburg that the press enjoys no special privilege 
or defense.11  Thus, the press has no elevated right to breach a contract, 
betray a confidence, trespass on land, or invade privacy in the name of 
getting out the news.  These cases are usually lumped with others that 
blandly declare that a neutral rule of law does not usurp First 
Amendment free speech.  The courts are sensitive about rules that would 
punish the publication itself or that examine its context.12  Although the 
interest of physical integrity is weighed heavily in the balance, free 
speech protections are outweighed only where the danger is highly likely 
and the publication serves little public utility.13 
 
publishing business is, in short, the only organized private business that is given explicit 
constitutional protection.”). But see First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) 
(Burger, C.J., concurring). The First Nat’l Bank Court stated:  
The Court has not yet squarely resolved whether the Press Clause confers upon the 
‘institutional press’ any freedom from government restraint not enjoyed by all 
others . . . .  Although certainty on this point is not possible, the history of the Clause 
does not suggest that the authors contemplated a ‘special’ or ‘institutional’ privilege. 
Id. 
 7. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
 8. 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1972). 
 9. Stewart, supra note 6, at 633. 
 10. In re Special Counsel Investigation, 338 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2004).  Interestingly 
enough, the source eventually authorized Ms. Miller to reveal his name.  Afterwards, the source, 
Vice-Presidential aide Louis “Scooter” Libby, was indicted for perjury.  Id. 
 11. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. at 798 (Burger, J., concurring). 
 12. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 13. See Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989); Braun v. 
Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992); Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune, Inc., 
2
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The cases that concern the press in newsgathering should be 
disaggregated.  Some, like Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.14 are easily 
justified under the First Amendment.  In Cohen, the Court found that the 
defendant who discloses confidential information can be found liable in 
promissory estoppel.  The court’s finding was protective of free speech.  
Without an assurance of confidentiality, sources would be reluctant to 
divulge information essential to public debate.  This is not to say that 
public policy may, on occasion, require the disclosure.15  For the press to 
be able to ignore confidentiality understandings would be destructive of 
the free press.  In the same way, in Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, 
Inc.,16  Glamour Magazine published an article about therapist-patient 
sexual abuse.17  Plaintiff gave information to the story’s author on 
condition that she not be identified or identifiable.  The story as 
published changed her name but supplied details that would allow a 
recipient to identify her.18  In contrast to Cohen where the damages were 
for the loss of employment, the loss to Ruzicka was more in terms of her 
reputation.  If the story was republished, could she have recovered those 
“publication” damages? 
Other cases like Food Lion19 and Sanders v. American 
Broadcasting Companies, Inc.,20 can be said to fall to neutral rules, but 
their outcomes will necessarily stem the flow of information to the 
public.  To find trespass liability in Food Lion will cool the undercover 
reporter.  Likewise in the Sanders case, the press must give 
consideration to the privacy expectations of the subject of reporting.  In 
Food Lion, the First Amendment was the primary reason the court 
rejected most of Food Lion’s claims21 and refused to give publication 
 
651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).  Cf. Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(addressing liability for advice on committing a murder); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. 
Supp. 802 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Sanders v. Acclaim Ent., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002) 
(discussing how games and videos incite crimes similar to those that took place at Columbine High 
School in  Colorado in 1999). 
 14. 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
 15. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343-344 (Cal. 1976). 
 16. 999 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 17. Id. at 1320. 
 18.  Id.  
 19. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 20. 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999). 
 21. For example, the Fourth Circuit rejected Food Lion’s fraud claims. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 
524.  Food Lion claimed that it incurred “administrative costs” in screening applications, 
interviewing, completing forms, and entering data into the payroll system for the two bogus 
employees.  Id. at 513.  Food Lion claimed that it believed that the two new “employees” would 
work longer than a couple of weeks, and that these costs totaled $1,944.62.  Id. at 512.  The court 
rejected the claim noting that the jobs were high turnover jobs and that the two reporters “did not 
3
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damages.22  This renders the plaintiff’s success essentially nugatory.  In 
Sanders v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.,23 the court describes a 
zone of privacy but would nevertheless give weight to the First 
Amendment by examining the newsworthy dimension of the 
information.  Nevertheless, on remand, Sanders was able to obtain a 
judgment of $600,000.24  The court flatly rejected the argument that 
Sanders was precluded from obtaining “publication damages” noting 
that the airing of the intrusion increased Sanders damages.25  In 
Bartnicki v. Vopper,26 the Court by a majority found that tapes that had 
originally been obtained in violation of federal and state law could be 
broadcast without violating plaintiff’s privacy rights.27  The 
newsworthiness of the tapes carried the day.28   
 
make any express representations about how long they would work.”  Id. at 524.  In addition, the 
court noted that both employees were “at will” employees who were subject to dismissal at any 
time.  Id. at 514. 
  The Fourth Circuit also rejected Food Lion’s first breach of loyalty claim which alleged 
that Food Lion did not “receive adequate services for the wages it paid” the two reporters.  Id.  The 
court found that the reporters performed quite competently during their period of employment, were 
paid because they showed up for work and performed their assigned tasks as Food Lion employees, 
and that “[t]heir performance was at a level suitable to their status as new, entry-level employees.” 
Id.  Indeed, shortly before Dale quit, her supervisor said she would “make a good meat wrapper.”  
Id.  When Barnett quit, her supervisor recommended that she be rehired if she sought reemployment 
with Food Lion in the future.  Id.  “In sum, Dale and Barnett were not paid their wages because of 
misrepresentations on their job applications.  Food Lion therefore cannot assert wage payment to 
satisfy the injurious reliance element of fraud.”  Id. 
 22. In its claim for such damages, Food Lion claimed that it suffered reputational damage, as 
well as loss of good will and lost sales.  Id. at 523. The trial court rejected the claim for publication 
damages noting that the damages “were the direct result of diminished consumer confidence in the 
store” and that “it was [Food Lion’s] food handling practices themselves—not the method by which 
they were recorded or published— which caused the loss of consumer confidence.”  Id. at 522 
(citing Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 963 (M.D.N.C.1997)).  The 
court therefore concluded that the publication damages were not proximately caused by the 
non-reputational torts committed by ABC’s employees.  Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522. 
 23. 978 P.2d 67. 
 24. Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., No. B094245 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1999), 1999 WL 
1458129. 
 25. The court stated that: 
We reject defendants’ claim that the damages were excessive because they included 
broadcast damages for a non-broadcast tort. The argument assumes that it is only the 
wrongful intrusion, not the broadcast, that causes damage. Here, however, the damages 
from the intrusion were increased by the fact that the intrusion was broadcast.   
Id. at 3 (citing Dietemann v. Time, Inc. 449 F.2d 245, 249-250 (9th Cir.1971)). “Although the 
Supreme Court did not reach this issue, it noted that Dietemann had rejected the claim.”  Id. 
(citing Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 495-96 n.18 (1998)). 
 26. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 27. Id. at 535. 
 28. See RODNEY SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS (Oxford Univ. Press 1986). 
4
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III.  THE PROPER DAMAGE CALCULATION 
“Newsworthiness” is the elusive concept that protects the First 
Amendment value.  The concept of “newsworthiness” has a long history.  
It is one that gives little comfort in cabining the privacy tort and giving 
courts guidance in balancing the interests in conflict.  Our suggestion is 
to take an approach that follows Food Lion.  The remedy provided may 
recognize the plaintiff’s property rights but modulate the damages to 
weigh free speech concerns.  This approach is similar to the one used in 
cases like Gertz29 and Dun & Bradstreet,30 defamation cases involving 
private individuals.  This is effectively what happened in Food Lion 
because the court refused to award publication damages. 
Sullivan, as critics have properly argued, was tunnel-visioned.  
Prior to that decision, the remedy of damages often swelled by punitive 
damages, was still a pot of gold at the end of hard litigation.  Perhaps the 
goal of reform would have been better served by allowing a vindication 
of reputation but reducing the expected damages.  John Fleming 
suggested this about twenty-five years ago.31  To modulate punishment 
has been long recognized in the law.  Recall the old case of Regina v. 
Dudley & Stephens32 – the cabin boy who was murdered and feasted on 
by his fellow lifeboat castaways.  The court convicted the accused of 
murder but gave a life sentence that was later commuted to a matter of 
months.  In that way, the right was vindicated but the utilitarian 
exigencies were recognized in the ultimate result.  The cries for reform 
in defamation have faded.  Sometimes they have foundered on 
constitutional rocks, but, more often, they have not been taken up 
enthusiastically by the press.33 
Similarly, with privacy invasions, we suggest that the damages 
awarded could be carefully tailored.  For example, if the “hat cam” 
footage in Sanders is broadcast, the beginning inquiry is to ask what 
damage has been caused.  If business is being run in a fraudulent fashion 
the assumption would be that the business would soon be found out.  In 
any event, even if the business’ reputation is damaged, that reputation is 
 
 29. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 30. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
 31. John G. Fleming, Retraction and Reply: Alternative Remedies for Defamation, 12 U. 
BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 15 (1978).  See Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping 
Sullivan in its Proper Place, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1988); SMOLLA, supra note 25. 
 32. [1884] 14 Q.B.D. 273. 
 33. C.f., THE UNIF. CORRECTION OR CLARIFICATION OF DEFAMATION ACT (1993).  See also 
THE LIBEL REFORM PROJECT OF THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM, PROPOSAL FOR 
REFORM OF LIBEL LAW (1988); David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. 
REV. 487 (1991). 
5
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simply being brought down to the proper level.  But we concede that 
Dietemann34 allows enhanced damages for subsequent publication. 
Likewise, emotional distress damages may flow from invasion of 
privacy.35  Recall that an element of the intrusion and revelation of 
private information torts is “offensiveness.”  The formulation of the tort 
fuels the scope of the damages.  But their extent should be limited where 
the information is of a kind that should be revealed for the public good.  
Unfortunately, little attempt has been made to carefully articulate 
privacy damages in this manner.  There is a need to make sure that 
privacy damages are assessed to vindicate the privacy interest, but at a 
level that prevents prevent privacy actions from becoming substitute 
libel actions free of the strictures of New York Times v. Sullivan.  This, it 
will be recalled, was the firm message of the Falwell case,36 deciding 
that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was not 
sufficiently sensitive to the requirements of Sullivan.  Since Falwell was 
a public figure, it was necessary for him to jump through the Sullivan 
actual malice hoop. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, as it has become difficult for defamation plaintiffs to 
recover large damage judgments on defamation theories, litigants have 
tended to shift the litigation to non-reputational theories.  Included 
within the panoply of suits are actions for fraud, promissory estoppel, 
trespass, breach of loyalty, and invasion of privacy (of the intrusion 
sort).  Litigants have had some success with these alternative approaches 
in the sense that they have been able to obtain judgments against media 
outlets for their reporting.  In a couple of the cases, in particular Cohen 
and Sanders, plaintiffs were able to obtain substantial damages. 
In general, plaintiffs’ ability to obtain substantial damages against 
media defendants is directly proportional to their ability to obtain so-
called “publication damages.”  In Food Lion, because plaintiff was 
denied “publication damages,” it received only a trivial recovery – 
plaintiff’s trial judgment was lowered from $1,400 compensatory 
damages and $5.5 million in punitive damages to only $2.  Very 
substantial damages were obtained in Cohen and Sanders ($200,000 and 
$600,000, respectively) because plaintiffs were allowed to recover 
 
 34. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 35. See Cheatham v. Pohl, 789 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. 2003) (determining damages at $100,000 for 
invasion of privacy where former husband distributed nude photographs of his former wife). 
 36. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
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publication damages. 
In future cases, the courts may be forced to deal more 
straightforwardly with the First Amendment issues.  In Sanders, the 
court avoided those issues because they were not raised.  As a result, the 
court left open the possibility that, even in an intrusion case a media 
defendant might be allowed to show that the invasion of privacy was 
“justified by the legitimate motive of gathering the news.”37  These 
issues should gain in importance and undoubtedly will be litigated more 
specifically in future cases.  In Sullivan, the Court was concerned about 
the chilling effect of defamation judgments on reporting.  When 
alternative theories produce very substantial damages for reporting 
truthfully on matters of public concern (as was true in both Cohen and 
Sanders), there is a very substantial chilling effect on the media.  Since 
the constitutional issue was not raised in the lower courts, the court did 
not address it.38  Moreover, the very existence of the litigation 
undoubtedly has a negative impact on the press’ willingness to report on 
matters of public interest.  Litigation is costly and few media 
organizations want to become embroiled in extensive and continuing 
litigation.  As a result, cases like Food Lion, Cohen and Sanders have 
the potential to limit press usage of overly aggressive forms of 
undercover reporting.  The day of gentlemanly behavior in the press so 
lauded in the seminal Brandeis piece has now passed.  The tabloid press 
that is “often shrill, one-sided, and offensive, and sometimes 
defamatory,” must be tolerated.39  The courts, however, will draw a line 
when press behavior is gratuitous and tramples on other rights.  Based 
on Cowles, the Court does not deem such tactics worthy of special 
constitutional protection.  Only time will tell whether these alternative 
suits have had a major impact on the way the press gathers information. 
 
 
 37. Sanders, 978 P.2d at 77. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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